This essay explores the nationalization of beer in twentieth-century China. Using the theoretical framework of "culinary infrastructure," it shows how the physical facilities and technologies of brewing and marketing interacted with local drinking cultures to shape the understandings of beer in China. It begins by describing how a western consumer good originally marketed to colonial representatives was gradually adopted by the urban Chinese as a symbol of modernity in the first half of the twentieth century. It then reviews the nationalization of foreign-owned breweries and the growth of domestic production in the first decades of Communist rule. The essay concludes that the Chinese acquired a taste for beer as an everyday marker of urban privilege that survived Maoist radicalism and remains to this day a defining feature of Communist China. 
INTRODUCTION
China's recent global economic ascendancy has prompted widespread attention to the country's particular version of state capitalism, which the architect of economic reform, Deng Xiaoping, labeled "socialism with Chinese characteristics." As is the case in countless other industries, China is also the world's largest producer of beer, and attempts by international firms to enter the Chinese market since the 1990s have met with limited success. To explain the ability of Chinese brewers to compete with more technically advanced foreign rivals, the economist Junfei Bai and his coauthors emphasized the distinctive nature of the local market, paraphrasing Deng's slogan with "beer" in place of "socialism." They cited Chinese preferences for undifferentiated quality, low price, and unique tastes, such as that for clam-juice beer, as evidence that foreign firms selling premium brands "just do not 'get' the China beer market" (Bai, Huang, Rozelle, & Boswell, 2011, p. 184) .
Although local knowledge is unquestionably vital for successful marketing, evaluating the development of the Chinese beer industry from a historical perspective also requires careful attention to chronology. Noting that beer remained a luxury until economic reform began in 1978, Bai and his colleagues pointed to the 1990s as the turning point in Chinese brewing.
This interpretation fits within a broader social science literature emphasizing the transformative nature of consumerism following the privations of the Great Leap Famine (1959 Famine ( -1961 and the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (Jun, 2000; Davis, 2000; Latham, Thompson, & Klein, 2006; Gerth, 2010; Li, 2010) . But historians have noted important antecedents to contemporary industrial modernity and consumer culture in early-twentiethcentury China (Cochran, 1999; Lu, 1999; Gerth, 2003; Dikötter, 2006) . Both social scientists and historians have largely shared the assumption that the growth of Chinese consumerism was temporarily suppressed under the rule of Mao Zedong, who insisted that people be provided with the "necessary" but not the "superfluous" (Hoffmann, 1971) . Nevertheless, beer had become enough of a necessity in China that the number of breweries increased more than tenfold between 1949 and 1976. Whereas only about seven firms served a largely foreign clientele on the eve of the Communist revolution, the hundred or more breweries operating at the time of Mao's death set the stage for reform-era growth (Zhu, Qi, & Wu, 1980) . One historical study that spans the twentieth century-Zhiguo Yang's exemplary account of the brewery in Qingdao-emphasizes the progressive nationalization of beer in China. Founded in 1903 by German colonists, the brewery adopted the colonial spelling Tsingtau, later Tsingtao, and served a predominantly European clientele. When Japanese forces seized the German concession in Shandong Province during World War I, the new owners sought to market the beer to local consumers; however, sales remained low because the Chinese had not yet acquired much of a taste for beer. After World War II, the Nationalist managers hoped to expand Tsingtao's sales in major cities, such as Shanghai and Nanjing, but made little progress due to the instability caused by the civil war. When the Communists took over, they saw the brewery as a valuable source of foreign revenue, and the beer was not marketed nationally until the 1990s (Yang, 2007) . Because of its distinctive origins and export markets, the brewery at Qingdao can offer only limited insights on the wider Chinese beer industry.
Building on Yang's work, this essay explores the nationalization of beer throughout twentieth-century China with a special focus on the Maoist period. It adopts the theoretical framework of "culinary infrastructure" to show how the physical facilities and technologies of brewing and marketing interacted with local drinking cultures to shape the understandings of beer in China (Pilcher, 2016; Wilson, 2005) . The narrative begins by examining how a western consumer good originally marketed to colonial representatives was gradually adopted by urban Chinese as a symbol of modernity in the first half of the twentieth century.
It then outlines the nationalization of foreign-owned breweries and the growth of domestic production in the first decades of Communist rule. The essay concludes that the Chinese acquired a taste for beer as an everyday marker of urban privilege that survived Maoist radicalism and remains to this day a defining feature of Communist China (Eyferth, 2009; Brown, 2012) .
MAKING BEER CHINESE
Upon first tasting beer in 1905, a Chinese consumer spat out:
"Ugh, what kind of black brew is this? It looks like medicine! And that foam on top! You can't drink it-not on your life!" (Höllmann, 2014, p. 149 (Smart, 2005; Shen & Wang, 1998) . Instead, the association of beer with imperialist powers meant that the appeal of the beverage, which might otherwise have been appreciated by many, was originally limited to progressive, urban Chinese.
These modernists, often writers for western-style newspapers that proliferated around the turn of the century, played a crucial role in the domestication of beer. Together with the brewers themselves, they tried to strike a fine balance between the foreign and the national, emphasizing the allure of modernity while preserving connections with Chinese antiquity (Gerth, 2003) .
Westerners introduced beer to China in the nineteenth century, and it remained for some time a source of imperial distinction. Merchants imported beer to the colony of Hong Kong, the "treaty ports" of Shanghai and Tianjin, and even interior provinces, such as Hunan (Parsons, 1900 (Zhu & Qi, 1981) .
Despite these various western enterprises, Japan was the imperial power most dedicated to building local markets for beer. Beginning with the Meiji era (1868-1912), Japanese officials were determined to modernize the country and adopt European technology and culture, including beer. Two firms, Dai Nippon (Great Japanese) and Kirin (a mythological beast), had consolidated the domestic beer market by 1906 and looked abroad for growth in places such has Manchuria, where the Japanese had recently defeated the Russian army (Alexander, 2013) . A German journalist optimistically declared: "In China, as in Korea, the local population is turning ever more toward a taste for beer" (Globus, 1906, p. 339) . Nevertheless, Japanese imports had undercut German brands among Chinese consumers as well as Japanese merchants (Berichte Consularämter, 1908, p. 37 (Zhang, 2008; Zhang, 2014 (Woodhead, 1926, pp. 170-171) and began work at the Yantai Brewery (Yang, 2007; Xu, 1939a) .
Founded in 1921 near Qingdao, the company had originally employed an Austrian brewer, and built strong markets in Shanghai, although financial problems caused it to be taken over by the Bank of China in 1934 (Godley 1986 ). The Chinese expert saved the company money on spurious foreign expenses charged by the previous brewer, who had pocketed $5,000 annually for chemicals to produce carbonated gas that was actually a natural product of fermentation. Zhu also solved the problem of coldweather turbidity, eliminating winter-time returns from retailers (Zhu, 1991; Zhu, 1939a little from that of any modern city at the time. "Newspaper advertising, first in Shanghai, to be followed later by insertions in leading Tientsin and Hankow papers, is a minimum requirement."
These could be followed up by inexpensive "novelties, handbills and calendars, and also by the display of posters on walls and signboards, in street cars, and on slides in motion-picture houses" ("Foreign Trade Opportunities," 1917, pp. 136-137 Qichao, reputedly loved drinking beer and would order it whenever he went to a restaurant in Shanghai (Xu, 1917) . As the historian Mark Swislocki (2009) has observed, such restaurants were an important site for cross-cultural exchange, not only between
Chinese and westerners, but also among migrants from different regions of China. By the 1930s, beer had reportedly spread from western restaurants in Shanghai to traditional Chinese dining places in Beijing as well (Xiao, 1937 (Smith, 2012) . Only in 1946, after the defeat of the Japanese, did Nationalist Chinese managers at Qingdao adopt the city's iconic harbor lighthouse as the brewery's logo, and even then, they used a simple cartoon at first (see Figure 2 ). A few years later an artist refined the image with the classic modernist lines that still appear on bottles of Tsingtao to this day (see Figure 3 ). Other logos used in the 1930s included Yantai's "Immortal Island," "Two-Headed
Birds," and "Three Glories"; Shuanghesheng's "Five Star"; and the Guangzhou Brewery's "Five Goats," a beloved local symbol ("Domestically Produced Beer," 1935; Reports of Guangdong, 1937 (Cao, 1982, p. 133 ).
Images of beer in newspapers, whether intended as product held up a mug to the camera and challenged the reader: "Twenty bottles of beer, let's empty them!" (Yin, 1944) . When women did appear along with beer, they were often associated with production rather than consumption, for example, in an image of female factory workers ("Pijiu gongchang," 1941). (Zhu, 1939b) .
On the eve of the Communist Revolution in 1949, western beer had made only limited inroads among Chinese consumers.
Of the dozen or so breweries founded in China during the first half of the twentieth century, only seven were still in operation, mostly in the northeastern part of the country, with the breweries in Shanghai and Guangzhou being exceptions. Even these factories were in poor shape after two decades of foreign invasion and civil war. Total output from the national industry amounted to a mere 7 million liters, and consumption was limited to the urban middle classes, especially intellectuals, and some well-off workers (Zhu & Qi, 1981) . Nevertheless, Chinese brewers and modernists had succeeded in localizing the product to such an extent that the Communists sought to revitalize production of beer rather than ban it as a symbol of western imperialism and bourgeois decadence.
Beer and revolution in China
In January 1958, Chairman Mao called for a Great Leap Forward, a massive program of industrial modernization and agricultural collectivization, which was intended to launch China to the top ranks of industrial nations but instead resulted in a famine that killed some 30 million people (Thaxton, 2008; Dikötter, 2010) .
Although generally associated with heavy industry, particularly the disastrous attempt to build backyard steel mills, the Great Leap also sought to increase production of consumer goods, including beer. Unlike steel, which could only be effectively produced in large-scale factories, beer could in fact be brewed successfully in small-scale communal factories, and output peaked at 146 million liters in 1960 -in the midst of the great famine (Zhu & Qi, 1991) . The image of party cadres and factory workers drinking In 1952, Jardine Matheson declared the brewery bankrupt and sold it to the government, which renamed the firm Huaguang (Light of China) (Yang, 2007; Shai, 1989 it was my responsibility to teach the workers how to operate the machinery and to explain the theory behind it. It was too slow to hold classes, so I ended up working together with them and taught them through actual practice" (Zhu, 1991, p. 49 ; see also Yang, 2007; Zhu, Qi, & Wu, 1980 (Yang, 2007) . Within the domestic market, officials recognized that few Chinese people had acquired a taste for beer and most lacked the income to purchase it on a regular basis. Factory output of beer, like other commodities, was distributed under the bureaucratic system of tonggou tongxiao (unified purchase and guaranteed sale) intended to maximize production with little regard for market demand (Solinger, 1984) .
In practice, beer was largely reserved for party elites, which gave 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 Tsingtao Brewery National Production Sources: Zhu & Qi (1981, pp. 41-54) ; Guo (2006, p. 188 ).
To facilitate this national expansion, the Chinese government made ambitious plans to increase supplies of raw materials. Brewers experimented with new sources of malt, especially maize, which was grown widely in the north as a source of animal feed and had long been used as a brewing adjunct in the United States (Tsingtao National Brewery, 1958) . Meanwhile, at a National Hop Conference held in 1958, Du Zhiduan, the Minister for Light Industry, set a goal of achieving self-sufficiency in hop production within three years. Qi Zhidao, manager of the Tsingtao Brewery, encouraged local cooperatives to grow hops, supplying them with vines and growing racks. The farmers were reluctant at first to sacrifice their autonomy to a single purchaser, but they prospered from steady sales to the brewery. The Ministry of Light Industry eventually established a network of experimental hop farms throughout the country, both in coastal industrial centers such as Tianjin, Shanghai, and Zhejiang, as well as in more remote locations of Gansu, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia (Zhu, 1990) .
Despite the surge in output, the Great Leap did not achieve the stated goal of the Yuquan Conference, and brewing remained concentrated in coastal industrial cities, particularly in the Northeast. Such a geographical distribution fit more with the unstated purpose of the Great Leap, exploiting agriculture to finance industrialization. In 1959 and 1960, China exported 6 million tons of grain, even as national production fell by more than 50 million tons (Ash, 2006) . Nevertheless, the Tsingtao Brewery remained China's only significant beer exporter at the time, and it accounted for no more than 10% of national production. Admittedly, urban workers also suffered during the Great Famine, although not on the scale of rural starvation (Brown, 2012) . Even discounting exaggerated production figures, the Great Leap clearly made beer more available to privileged sectors of society-including party cadres, the military, and workers in strategic industries-at the expense of China's peasantry.
Although beer production declined for the next five years, sought to balance export growth with the demands of domestic breweries in Shanghai and other major cities (Yang, 2007) .
Meanwhile, the government consolidated hop production in two remote western provinces of Gansu and Xinjiang, where dry climate made for irrigated and favorable growing conditions, and which freed up periurban agricultural land for more valuable truck farming, since the hops could easily be dried and shipped to breweries (Luo, n.d.) .
By the 1970s, beer had become a typical consumer good in socialist China, with all the shortages, inequalities, and imperfections that this entailed. Access to consumer goods was generally determined by workplace, with staple foods distributed at the end of the week or before holidays. The
Ministry of Light Industry also maintained a network of stores, where shoppers could make purchases with ration books and coupons, if they could find anything on the shelves (Davis, 2000) . Under Chinese socialism, the quality of goods was ranked by "fame" (mingsheng 名声) instead of price. Tsingtao Beer was declared a "famous alcoholic beverage" at the Second National Alcohol Exhibition in 1963, and therefore, qualified for national distribution, although it was mostly reserved for export.
Provincial bureaucrats distributed "locally famous alcoholic
beverages," such as Shenyang Snow, Shanghai Seagull, and
Beijing Special beers within the urban markets where they were produced (Cao, 1982) . 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 Sources: Zhu & Qi (1981) ; Guo (2006, p. 185, 188) .
After the launch of economic reforms, production rose from 600 million liters in 1980 to 6 billion in 1990, but industrial structures inherited from the Maoist period persisted into the 1990s and beyond (Guo, 2006) . "Literally hundreds of small breweries emerged from the rice paddies," wrote the economist Bai Junfei and his colleagues, with only a measure of hyperbole (Bai, Huang, Rozelle, & Boswell, 2011, p. 268) . The decollectivization of agriculture and the growth of farm productivity made it possible to divert grain to brewing, but factories were still mostly inefficient, state-owned enterprises. "A county's beer factory frequently was its status symbol" (Bai, Huang, Rozelle, & Boswell, 2011, p. 268) .
Brewing remained concentrated in industrial centers, particularly along the coast, as it does to this day (see Figure 4) . Zhejiang alone accounted for more than 100 of the 741 breweries at the peak of the industry's numerical growth in the mid-1990s. Most of these enterprises were unprofitably small in scale, but local Even as Maoist-era shortages were overcome, beer remained the privilege of urban Chinese society. A map of per capita beer consumption correlates strongly with income: Beijing was at the top, followed by industrial centers along the coast, and the impoverished south and west were at the bottom (see Figure 5 ). But the map also reveals the historical legacy of beer drinking in the Northeast, particularly in the largely rural province of Heilongjiang.
Although quite comfortable financially, in comparison to other agrarian provinces, Northeasterners drink more beer than their counterparts in the far wealthier industrial province of Guangdong, where the tropical heat might seem to call out for cold beer. Per capita averages can conceal wide inequalities within provinces, but a survey of urban consumers at the turn of the millennium found that even among the working poor half of all households consumed beer. Income clearly still mattered, since the highest rates of consumption (72%) was by the richest 5% of the population (Cui & Liu, 2001) . Drinking cultures reflected these disparities; while modest urban dwellers might share a beer at domestic family celebrations, the newly rich drank beer regularly in restaurants and nightclubs, such as the brightly lit Taipei-style pijiuwu (beer halls) that became fashionable in Shanghai and Beijing in the 1990s (Farrer & Field, 2015; Gold, 1993 A final legacy of Maoist era brewing was the persistence of low quality, even in the face of global competition. As late as the 1990s, more than half of all breweries reportedly failed quality tests. Shopkeepers and customers alike faced a game of Russian roulette, as by some estimates, roughly one inferior glass bottle in every case exploded before it could be consumed. Wary drinkers learned to fill plastic bags with beer from the kegs displayed prominently in corner stores across urban China (Slocum, 2006; "Beer Too Strong," 1999) . But low quality had been a tradeoff that China's original brewmaster, Zhu Mei, was willing to make in order to put beer in the hands of the proletariat. Although capable of brewing full-bodied Munich dark beers, he focused on the cheapest of adjunct lagers, and rather than spend valuable foreign currency on imported pure yeast, he bred his own yeast, overlooking any imperfections that resulted (Zhu 1939b) . His plan to build small-scale breweries foundered on the grain shortages of the Great Leap Forward, but he was nevertheless promoted to the rank of senior engineer in the Ministry of Light Industry, where he continued to develop the national industry. By the late 1970s, beer accounted nearly a fourth of all the alcohol produced in China, a figure that has now grown to nearly 90% (Guo, 2006) . Despite Chairman Mao's preference for the potent liquor Maotai, Zhu had the final word with his plan to convert the Chinese from baijiu to beer.
CONCLUSION
The available evidence suggests that brewing was a rather ordinary industry in Mao's China, which is to say autarkic, backward, inefficient, politically fraught, and intensely nationalistic. With its modern, industrial production, beer appealed to the CCP as a mildly alcoholic and more grain-efficient alternative to the hard liquor produced in rustic distilleries throughout the Chinese countryside. But to achieve that promise required significant work, for the handful of factories that existed in China in 1949 had been neglected during two decades of warfare. Zhu Mei and his colleagues rebuilt the national industry with minimal outside assistance, improvising solutions to the myriad technical complications that arose. The failures of agricultural collectivization severely limited the volume of grain that could be brewed into beer, and the best quality product was, in any event, exported to earn foreign currency. Nevertheless, the communally owned enterprises founded during the Maoist period provided a base for the explosive growth of brewing that followed economic reforms in 1978.
The experience of Maoist China also has relevance for the marketing of beer around the world, demonstrating that it was not mass advertising alone that made lager a ubiquitous global commodity. Although promotional campaigns and modernist intellectuals in pre-revolutionary China collaborated to develop a genealogy of beer that made it seem simultaneously patriotically local and alluringly foreign, the taste for beer remained limited to a handful of cities before 1949. The CCP seems to have encouraged a much wider demand for beer through non-market forms of conspicuous consumption. Simply put, beer became a form of urban privilege in a society defined by scarcity. Zhu himself provided oblique evidence for this point when he recalled: "During the great famine, no employees of the beer factory experienced dropsy" (Zhu & Qi, 1981, p. 54) .
While intended as a testimony to the health qualities of beer, it provided a more telling statement on the profound inequality of food distribution within Maoist China. The great thirst for beer in the decades that followed was in some ways a response to that era of deprivation.
